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Recent Cases
BILLS AND NOTES-NEGOTIABILITY-EFFECT OF TITLE-RETENTION PROVISIONS
Legal Loan & Inv. Ass'n v. Arnold-
In partial payment of laundry machinery purchased from the Eagle Laundry
Machinery Company, defendant executed the promissory notes here sued upon.
A chattel mortgage to secure the notes had been contemporaneously executed and
duly recorded. Plaintiff purchased the notes in good faith and for value prior to
their maturity and here seeks to hold defendant free from defense of payment to
vendor (by means of laundry service). The following provision was included in
each of the notes:
"This note is given to secure payment on the purchase of (laundry machinery)
delivered by me to Eagle Laundry Machinery Co .... Said property is now and is
to remain the property of the said Eagle Laundry Machinery Co.... until this note
and all other notes given in payment of said machine or any renewal of same or
any part thereof is fully paid, then such purchase shall be absolute, but not before,
and if at any time any note shall not be paid within 10 days of the date when the
same becomes due and payable, all notes not paid shall immediately become due
and payable and it shall be lawful for the Eagle Laundry Machinery Co., or their
agents, to enter.., and take possession of said property and dispose of it to their
advantage, crediting this note and all other notes not paid with the net proceeds
above expenses, or the said company may take any other lawful proceedings to
enforce its rights."
Held: The notes were negotiable and plaintiff might recover as a holder in
due course.
At the time of the drafting of the Negotiable Instruments Law, American
authorities were divided on the effect of such title retention agreements. Chicago
Ry. v. Merchant? Bank,2 holding these notes negotiable, presented the majority
view.3 The minority doctrine was represented by Sloan v. McCarty,4 and similar
1. 150 S.W. (2d) 544 (Mo. App. 1941).
2. 136 U. S. 268 (1890).
3. Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28, 74 N.W. 289 (1898); Howard v. Simp-
kins, 70 Ga. 322 (1883) (provisions giving the vendor the right to possession was
not discussed); J. B. Pyron & Son v. Ruohs, 120 Ga. 1060, 48 S.E. 434 (1904);
Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48, 5 So. 627 (1889). Note, however, Fleming v. Sher-
wood, 24 N.D. 144, .139 N.W. 101, 102 (1912), in which the court said that the
weight of authority, before the N.I.L., was against the negotiability of title-re-
taining notes,
4. 134 Mass. 245 (1883).
(178)
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decisions,5 which found the promise to pay to be conditioned upon the future
transfer of title, expressly stated in the note to be retained b3 -the payee, to the
maker. As the title would not automatically move to the maker upon payment of
the note, especially where circumstances (such as destruction of the goods) made
it impossible for the holder of the note to perform, there might be no obligation
to pay the money. The conclusion obtained by the majority was reached by regard-
ing the retention of title as a mere security device; that the promise to pay was
unconditional since the purchaser-maker secured the possession, which was what
he bargained for; and that risk of loss did not accompany title in such a case, but
fell on the purchaser. In this connection, it should be observed that both before6
and under the Uniform Sales Act,7 risk of loss is upon the conditional purchaser
where he is in actual possession, so that in any event, the maker would not be
excused, and therefore there appears no condition, express or implied, to his promise
to pay. Also, it should be noted, that the mere fact that there is a disclosure on the
instrument of the occasion or transaction giving rise to the document, does not make
the order or promise conditional.8
A distinction between a conditional sale, where title never passed to the maker,
and a completed sale with a retention of title in the payee for security purposes
only, has been attempted by the Michigan court, it being held that in the former
case the note is not negotiable, 9 while in the latter case it is negotiable. 10 The
Supreme Court of Michigan distinguishes the two cases on their facts, but it would
seem that if one instrument is negotiable, the other is also.
By Section 3 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law," "An unqualified,
order or promise to pay is unconditional within the meaning of this act, though
coupled with . .. (2) a statement of the transaction which gives rise to the,
instrument." The adequacy of this language has brought forth a good deal of
discussion. Dean Ames, though he approved the prevailing view that such notes
5. Killam v. Schoeps, 26 Kan. 310 (1881); Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding,
161 Mich. 254, 126 N.W. 212 (1910). The following Minnesota decisions are often
cited in accord, but would seem distinguishable in that the notes involved all con-
tained clauses allowing the vendor-payee to retake possession at any time he
might think himself insecure. Third Natl. Bank v. Armstrong, 25 Minn. 530 (1879);
Stevens v. Johnson, 28 Minn. 172, 9 N.W. 677 (1881); Deering v. Thom, 29 Minn.
120, 12 N.W. 350 (1882).
6. WILLISTON, SALES, (2d ed.) §§ 304, 334.
7. UNIFORMt SALES AcT, § 22.
8. Note (1928) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 476.
9. Worden Grocer Co. v. Blanding, 161 Mich. 254, 126 N.W. 212 (1910), in
which the recital was: "This note is given for a stock of groceries, title to which
is to remain in the payee until this note full paid." The court was of the opinion
that this disclosed a conditional sales contract rather than a negotiable note. See
also, Fleming v. Sherwood, 24 N.D. 144, 139 N.W. 101 (1912).
10. Choate v. Stevens, 116 Mich. 28, 74 N.W. 289 (1898). Here the recital
read: "Consideration of this note is the soda water apparatus received of the
payee; it is understood that the title to the above mentioned property does not
pass until all notes are paid." It was held that this showed a mere security transac-
tion and did not affect negotiability.
11. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3019.
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were not conditional, questioned whether the second sub-section was sufficient to
change the law in those states where it had been decided otherwise. Judge Brewster
insisted that the language used was adequate and that the intention behind this
particular section was to unify the law in conformity with the previous weight of
authority.12
History has shown the same difference of opinion to exist under the Negotiable
Instruments Act as existed prior to the enactment thereof.' 3 In view of the purpose
of the Act, and the intent of the drafters thereof, the substantial uniformity now
existing should be transformed into the complete uniformity which was sought.
Retention of title and right of possession in the vendor-payee, with the latter
to take effect only upon default, offers no different problem, since the vendor-payee's
right to take possession is dependent upon the purchaser-maker's default, and
payment of the note will perform the contract.'4
EUGENE M. SACKIN
12. For the Ames-Brewster Controversy, see Ames, The Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (1900) 14 HAiv. L. Ray. 241; Brewster, A Defense of the Law (1900)
10 YALE L. J. 84; Ames, A Word More (1901) 14 HARv. L. REv. 442; Biewster,
Rejoinder to Dean Ames (1901) 15 HtAv. L. REv. 26; Ames, Supplemental Note;
Brewster, Reply to Supplementary Note (these last two articles were published
in pamphlet issued by Harvard Press); McKeehan, Review of Ames-Brewster Con-
troversy (1902) 41 Am. L. REaG. (N.S.) 437, 499, 561. All of these articles were
reprinted in BmNNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (3d ed. 1920) 418-542.
13. Sie Note (1924) 28 A.L.R. 708 et seq.; (1926) 44 A.L.R. 1397. For cases
representing the minority view see: Fleming v. Sherwood, 24 N.D. 144, 139 N.W. 101
(1912) (where the word "ownership" was construed as including both title and
right to possession); American Nat]. Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac.
376 (1923); cf. Holt Mfg. Co. v. Jaussaud, 132 Wash. 667, 233 Pac. 35 (1925).
For cases expressing the majority view see: Ex parte Bledsoe, 180 Ala. 586, 61 So.
813 (1913); Commercial Credit Co. v. Parks, 215 Ala. 648, 112 So. 237 (1927);
Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S.W. 21 (1925); People's Bank v.
Porter 58 Cal. App. 41 208 Pac. 200 (1922); Welch v. Owenby 73 Okla. 212 175
Pac. 746 (1918) (vendor had full power of disposition without notice until pay-
ment); Citizens' Nat]. Bank v. Bucheit, 14 Ala. App. 511, 71 So. 82 (1916), affi'd,
72 So. 1019 (1916); Branch Banking and Trust Co. v. Leggett, 185 N.C. 65, 1f6
S.E. 1 (1923); First Nat]. Bank v. Newton, 119 Neb. 394, 229 N.W. 334 (1930);
A. J. Cols6n & Sons v. Ellis, 40 Ga. App. 768, 151 S.E. 654 (1930); Taylor v. Good-
rich Tire & Rubber Co., 20 Tenn. App. 352, 98 S.W. (2d) 1094 (1935); of. Whit-
lock v. Auburn Lumber Co. 145 N.C. 120 58 S.E. 909 (1907) (The N.I.L. was not
mentioned).
14. Kimball Co. v. Mellon, 80 Wis. 133 (1891); Welch v. Owenby, 73 Okla.
212, 175 Pac. 746 (1918); Heard v. Dubuque County Bank, 8 Neb. 10 (1878);
Wright v. Traver, 73 Mich. 493, 41 N.W. 517 (1889); People's Bank v. Porter, 58
Cal. App. 41 208 Pac. 200 (1922) in which the court said: "The power of the vendor-
payee to retake the chattel after dishonor did not affect the absolute promise to pay,
but merely gave the vendor-payee a choice of remedies." See note (1924) 28 A.L.R.
707.
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PROPERTY-REVOCABILITY OF LICENSEs-THEATER TICKETS
Cummins v. St. Louis Amusement Co.'
The plaintiff purchased a ticket to the defendant's motion picture theater and
while he was viewing the show, the picture was interrupted. There was conflicting
testimony as to whether or not the plaintiff caused a disturbance, but at any rate
the defendant's agents thereafter requested the plaintiff to leave and on his refusal
used force in ejecting him. The jury was instructed as follows: "You -are instructed
that under the law the theater ticket purchased by plaintiff was only a- license to
him to enter said theater, which license might at the pleasure of the defendant, with
or without any good reason therefor be revoked or canceled by requesting plaintiff
to leave the theater and by returning his admission fee. . . . You are further
instructed that whether or not plaintiff was making any noise or creating any
disturbance in the theater is of no consequence with respect to the right of the
defendant to eject him from the theater, which license could be revoked or can-
celed by defendant at any time, and for any reason, or for no reason at all." From
a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed challenging the correctness of
the charge that the defendant had a right to eject him without good cause. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the action, holding the instruction to be
erroneous.
It would be difficult to find a more confusing subject than that of licenses,
from the point of view both of theory and of terminology. The chief trouble has
been over the revocability of licenses. 2 Strictly speaking, a license is by definition
revocable.3 And if a so-called license is said to be irrevocable, it is really more
than a license as there is created an irrevocable interest similar to an easement or
a' profit 4 Usually, an irrevocable interest in land must be created by a signed
writing or by a deed under modern statutes. An attempt to pass such an interest
as an easement or a profit without a signed writing or a deed usually creates
a mere revocable license. On the other hand, if an interest is created by deed with
the intent to create only a revocable license, such intent is carried out.
In the case of Wood v. Leadbitter5Z ihe plaintiff bought a ticket to the defend-
ants race track and was forcibly ejected for no good cause after refusing to leave
on request. The ticket, since it was not a signed writing, was deemed to create
a mere license and as such, was always revocable at the pleasure of the grantor.
1. 147 S.W. (2d) 190 (Mo. 1941).
2. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND (1929) c. IL
3. ". . . a permission to do some act or series of acts on the land of the
licensor without having any permanent interest in it .-. . it is founded on personal
confidence, and therefore not assignable.... It may be given in writing or by parol;
it may be with or without consideration; but in either case it is subject to revoca-
tion, though constituting a protection to the party acting under it until the
revocation takes place." Morrill v. Mackman 24 Mich. 279 282 (1872); Stewart
v. Cincinnati, W. & M. Ry, 89 Mich. 315, 50 N.W. 852 (1891); Metcalf v. Hart,
3 Wyo. 513, 27 Pac. 900 (1892).
4. Tottell v. Howell, Noy, 54 (1595). "It was held by the court, that herba-
guim for years, cannot be granted without deed." Note- 17 E. 4, 6.
5. 13 M. & W. 838 (1845).
19421
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Thus there was no liability on the defendant as he could revoke the license at
his pleasure making the continued presence of the former licensee a trespass. This
case was the leading light on the subject and was t6niversally followed for many
years and is still followed to some extent today.6 But as was pointed out in a
later case,7 the theory of Wood v. Leadbitter is contrary to good sense and gives
a harsh result.
Where the license consisted of permission to turn a stream in a certain direction
or to use a way over land, and the grantee acted upon this permission, it was said
that the license was no longer revocable. 8 This was one exception to the sometimes
harsh result of the rule that a mere license is always revocable. This is what is
called an "executed license" or a "license acted upon." It might be said that this
license becomes irrevocable after being acted upon. However it would be better
to say that the licerse becomes an easement rather than an irrevocable license
which is really a contradiction in terms. The executed license theory cannot be
applied to the theater ticket situation however.
But a little over fifty years after Wood v. Leadbitter, there arose two other
theories, applicable to theater tickets, for making possible exceptions to the
6. See Capital Theater v. Compton, 246 Ky. 130, 54 S.W. (2d) 620 (1932),
where it-was said: "The ticket does not confer the right to enter or remain in the
theater if the holder be not disorderly or otherwise objectionable. It is a mere
license revocable at the will of the proprietor, or his agent, who may decline to
permit the holder to enter, or remove him after he has taken his seat, and, unless
the denial of admittance or the expulsion of the holder is accompanied by insult or
the use of more force than is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose, the
proprietor incurs no liability beyond the price of admission." See also: Marrone
v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913) where Mr. Justice Holmes upheld
the traditional theory of Wood v. Leadbitter, although giving the ticket-holder a
remedy for breach of contract, when he said, "As no more force was used than was
necessary to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon the track, the argument hardly
went beyond an attempt to overthrow the rule commonly accepted in this country
from the English cases, and adopted below, that such tickets do not create a right
in rem ... We see no reason for declining to follow the commonly accepted rule.
The fact that the purchase of a ticket made a contract is not enough. A contract
binds the person of the maker but does not create an interest in the property that
it may concern, unless it also operates as a conveyance. The ticket was not a
conveyance of an interest in the race track, not only because it was not under seal,
but because by common understanding it did not purport to have that effect. ... "
7. Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., 1 K.B. 1 (1915). Buckley, L. J. said,
If that proposition be true, it involves startling results. . . . Suppose that there
be sitting in the stalls a man who is a constant patron of the opera or the theater,
to whom the management pay great deference, whether from his rank or his
habit of attendance: he goes to the management and says 'I do not like the person
sitting in front of me or next to me; ask him to go.' It would be competent to
the management to go to that person and say, 'Please go; you cannot have your
money back; go.' Further, if the proposition is right, it follows that, having let the
seat to A., the management may come to A. at the end of the first act or before
and say, 'I revoke your license; go,' and he has to go. The management may let
the seat to B. for the rest of the performance, and at the end of the second act or
sooner they may come to B. and say, 'I revoke your license! go.' He will have to
go, and they may let the seat a third time to C. . ."
8. Rerick v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267 (Pa. 1826).
(Vol. 7
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revocable license doctrine. Both were expounded in the case of Hurst v. Picture
Theatres, Ltd." The plaintiff brought a tort action for assault and false imprison-
ment for being ejected from a picture theater. The court held that the ticket
was a license coupled with a grant and as such, it could not be revoked at the
defendant's pleasure and without good cause. The plaintiff was granted a right to
view and enjoy the spectacle and the license was merely one to enable him to go on
the premises to enjoy the grant. This then would not be a mere license but a
license coupled with a grant10 and a license coupled with a grant has always been
held to be irrevocable."- The other theory used by the court was that there was a
contract collateral to the license not to revoke until the conclusion of the spectacle.
Thus these two theories, a license coupled with a grant and a collateral contract
not to revoke, are employed to evade the harsh consequences of Wood v. Leadbitter.
In general, the Missouri law on this subject, although scant, has followed
along the lines of other jurisdictions, mainly that absent some contrary statutory
provision, a ticket of admission constitutes only a revocable license to enter; that
if the ticket-holder refuses to depart upon the proprietor's revocation for good
cause, he becomes a trespasser and thereupon may be, removed with such force
as may be reasonably necessary in accord with the rule which obtains with
respect to the removal of trespassers in general 2. However, a distinction should
be made betweeh three types of situations. One is where the ticket-holder is
creating a disturbance and the proprietor ejects him. Here clearly no action would
lie against the proprietor or as he had good cause to revoke the license. A second
situation is where the proprietor without any reason whatsoever revokes the license
and ejects the ticket-holder. There, in view of the Hurst case and subsequent
decisions, there could be a recovery in damages against the proprietor. The third
situation, and the one most difficult of solution, is where the proprietor thinks
he has reasonable cause to revoke when no such cause really exists. As to whether
the proprietor may revoke the license without reasonable cause, but under a good
faith belief that he has reasonable cause, the case of Hoagland v. Forest Park
Highlands Amusement Co.' 3 seems to give some indication. In that case, the
plaintiff refused to turn over a pocketbook he had found on the premises where-
9. 1 K.B. 1 (1915).
10. The simple case of a license coupled with a grant would be where a man is
given permission to hunt on another's land, and also given permission to take
off the land any game which he might kill. The grant is of the game the hunter
kills. The license is to remove from the land the game to which the hunter now
has title. The privilege of entering the land to hunt was also a license, but is
not the license which is coupled with the grant. The license coupled with a grant
would be irrevocable by the party who had given it, as he would be estopped from
defeating his own grant.
11. Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. & W. 838, 844: "A mere license is recovable;
but that which is called a license is often something more than a license; it often
comprises or is connected with a grant, and then the party who has given it cannot
in general revoke it, so as to defeat his grant, to which it was incident."
12. Pearce v. Spalding, 12 Mo. App. 141 (1882); Ayres v. Middleton Theater
Co., 210 S.W. 911 (Mo. App. 1919).
13. 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878 (1902).
19421
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upon the defendant proprietor revoked the license and ejected him. After deter-
mining that the defendant had no right to have the lost article turned over, the
court held that the trial court's instruction assuming the reasonableness of the
defendant's demand to be allowed to be custodian of the pocketbook to be error.
They then made the following observation:
"Another objection urged against the instruction is that it told the jury that
defendant might use force to eject the plaintiff from the premises for refusal to
comply with their request. But as plaintiff had the right to retain the property
as against all other persons except the true owner, it logically follows that the
defendants had no right to eject him from their premises upon that ground .... 14
The Hoagland case seems to be a definite statement that the grantor of a
ticket to a place of amusement cannot without just cause forcibly eject the holder
of the ticket without incurring tort liability for assault and battery. Relying
strongly on the Hoagland case, the appellate court in the instant case held the
instruction that defendant had a right to eject plaintiff with or without good
cause was wrong. It stated that regardless of the revocable nature of a license
granted by the sale of a ticket to a theater or any other place of amusement, the
proprietor nevertheless has no right to eject one of his patrons "without any
good reason therefor," or "for any reason," if that reason happens to be wrongful
or unfounded. Query whether this also means that the proprietor is liable in tort
where he thought he had a reasonable cause to revoke while he in reality did
not. This question still appears to be unanswered.
It is interesting to note that the Missouri cases reached the same just result
as did the Hurst case, but did not expound any theories or exceptions to avoid
the general doctrine that a ticket passes merely a revocable license and that the
grantor of such may use reasonable force in removing the holder when the license
is revoked. They give lip-service to the general doctrine but seem to say that
it is going too far to hold that such a license may be revoked without good cause.
This does seem to be more realistic than to say the ticket is a license coupled
with a grant when it is doubtful whether a property right was in fact granted and
if so, what kind of a property right it was; or to say that there is a collateral con-
tract not to revoke when in reality no such contract existed as the parties really
did not contemplate a contractual relationship. The whole trouble seems to be
caused by the age-old rules that an attempt to convey an interest in land without
a deed passes only a revocable license and that a ticket to a place of amusement
constitutes just such an attempt. Perhaps it would be better not to think of a
ticket as passing an interest in land, but to interpret it as a privilege to enjoy a
certain thing as long as such is done in good conduct consistent with the granting
of such privilege. In other words, think of a theater ticket as a theater ticket, and
from there formulate rules to govern the possible situations which may arise.
RICHARD H. LEWIN
14. 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878, 880 (1902).
[Vol. 7
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The ends of defendant's train stood about equidistant from the right angle
crossing, the middle boxcar standing on the crossing. The fireman, 150 feet from
the crossing, saw deceased's lights about 660 feet away. When the train in switch-
ing began its backward movement, at which time deceased was "well over" 100 feet
away, the fireman allegedly mentioned his having seen deceased's lights to the
engineer, but no warning signal was ever given. "As many as seven seconds"
thereafter deceased's truck ran into and knocked defendant's same, now slowly
backing, middle boxcar off the track, deceased being crushed by a tractor which
he was carrying on the back of his truck. The road was dry but black-top; there
was no fog; the wreck occurred between 6 and 7 P. M. in February when it was
"dusky dark"; and deceased's truck admittedly was in good running condition.
The parents of the seventeen-year-old decendent sued for the $10,000 penalty
under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute,- alleging primary and humanitarian
negligence; defendant's answer included allegations of contributory and sole
negligence, but the trial was mainly on primary and contributory negligence, with
verdict for defendant In affirming the order sustaining plaintiff's motion for new
trial, the Missouri Supreme Court conceded primary and contributory negligence
as a matter of law,3 but held that the humanitarian doctrine was applicable. On
the second trial, which was based on humanitarian negligence, plaintiffs recovered
a verdict for $2,000. On the basis of the supreme court's ruling, this judgment
was affirmed by the Springfield Court of Appeals.4
The holding of the supreme court, that the humanitarian dociiine was appli-
cable, is the subject of consideration. The court conceded the impossibility of
moving the train from the crossing so as to avoid the accident, but considered it
a jury question whether the deceased "could have checked the speed of the truck
enough to save his life" after and if any warning signal had been given. The ques-
tion therefore is, what factors gave rise to any duty on the part of the defendant to
give any warning?
"Imminent peril" within the humanitarian rule must be "certain, immediate,
and impending peril and not probability of danger or mere possibility of injury."'
Peril is imminent "only when the ordinary and natural effort to be expected in
such person would not put him in a place of safety." Further, the court recently
1. 148 S.W. (2d) 784 (Mo. 1941), and 157 S.W. (2d) 259 (Mo. App. 1941).
2. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 3652; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 3262, p. 3353.
3. Zickefoose v. Thompson, 148 S.W. (2d) 784, 788 (Mo. 1941). The court
said, '"e (deceased) was duty bound to look ahead because he was driving a motor
vehicle on the public highway, and was required by Sec. 8383, R. S. 1939, Mo. Stat.
Ann. § 777,p. 5197, to exercise the highest degree of care."
4. 157 S.W. (2d) 259 (Mo. App. 1941).
5. Lotta v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 342 Mo. 743, 751, 117 S.W. (2d)
296, 197 (1938); Becker, Hi.raanitarian Doctrine (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv. 406.
6. Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 273, 257 S. W. 482, 486 (1924);
notes (1941) 6 Mo. L. REV. 118 and 231.
1942]
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1942], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol7/iss2/8
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
reiterated that such terms as approaching, coming into, or about to go into a posi-
tion of peril improperly expand defendant's duty, and that defendant's duty prop-
erly arises only when plaintiff or decedent is in a position of imminent peril. 7 In
the instant case deceased's truck when last seen was several more than 100 feet
away, was approaching between 20 and 25 miles per hour, and needed less than
100 feet in which to stop. Besides the factor of the trainmen's right to assume
that the person will remain in a place of safety, until it is apparent that the
person is oblivious,8 it seems that deceased was excluded by definition from being
within the zone of imminent peril. Deceased not being in such peril, then defendant
could have no duty on the basis of the humanitarian peril.
Another possibility is that a duty might be predicated on the duties either
of lookout or of giving the statutory signal, 9 if either of these were regarded as
being continuouso and thus within the scope of humanitarian negligence. There
seem to be no cases directly negativing the existence of a continuous duty after
a train had reached and remained on the crossing, as the train had done in this
case, but the language of courts dealing with these duties is limited to making
either duty continuous only while the train is approaching the crossing." There
are two further correlated propositions which help justify the inference that
neither duty is continuous when the train is standing on the crossing. One is, as
concerns the duty of lookout, that the presence of the train itself is sufficient
'warning to travelers;' 2 the other is, by judicial construction, that the statutory
signals are to warn travelers only of trains approaching, and not of trains standing
on, the crossing.' 3 Although the court noted the fact that a flagman stood on the
7. Reiling v. Russell, 153 S.W. (2d) 6 (Mo. 1941); Hilton v. Terminal R.
R. Ass'n, 345 Mo. 987, 137 S.W. (2d) 520 (1940); Becker, Humanitarian Doctrine
(1940) 5 Mo. L. REV. 446, 450.
8. State ex rel. Alton R. R. v. Shain, 346 Mo. 681, 143 S.W. (2d) 233 (1940);
Poague v. Kurn, 346 Mo. 153, 140 S.W. (2d) 13 (1940); Camp v. Kurn, 142 S.W.
(2d) 772 (Mo. App. 1940); Becker, Humanitarian Doctrine (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv.
447, 452.
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 5213; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1929) § 4756, p. 2133.
10. Mayfield v. Kansas City So. Ry., 337 Mo. 79, 85 S.W. (2d) 116 (1935);
note (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv. 525.
11. State ex rel. Brosnahan v. Shain, 344 Mo. 404, 126 S.W. (2d) 1193
(1939); Womack v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 337 Mo 1160, 88 S.W. (2d) 368 (1935);
Mayfield v. Kansas City So. Ry., 337 Mo. 79, 85 S.W. (2d) 116 (1935).
12. Mabray v. Union Pac. R. R., 5 F. Supp. 397 (D.C. Colo. 1933); notes
(1935) 99 A.L.R. 1454, (1928) 56 A.L.R. 1114, (1921) 15 A.L.R. 901, to the
effect that in the absence of statutory requirements, the mere leaving of a train
across a highway without lights, without signaling, without a man with a lantern,
is not negligence.
13. Ausen v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 193 Minn. 316, 258 N.W.
511, 513 (1935); Crosby v. Great Northern Ry., 187 Minn. 263, 245 N.W. 31
(1932) (saying that "statutory signals for trains apprbaching a highway crossing
are solely for the benefit of travelers so as to warn them of approaching trains.
They are immaterial when and where, as here, the train is actually upon and
occupying; the crossing when the traveler arrives. . . . The requirement for signals
and warnings as to such crossings is not for the purpose of preventing automobile
drivers from running into the side of trains .... It would seem that a train upon a
crossing is itself effective and adequate warning.")
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side of the track opposite to the direction from which deceased approached, 14 it
has been held that such additional warning of the train's presence is unnecessary
in the absence of special circumstances.'5  The court admitted that no special
circumstances existed in the instant case;' 6 and therefore it seems that no duty
could arise on the theories of a continuous duty or of special conditions.
A basis for imposing a duty upon defendant might be found in the court's
statement that ". . . the fireman told the engineer that the truck was coming,
showing he thought the situation was perilous." (italics mine) Assuming the
court meant "imminently" perilous, yet if the fireman had no duty to warn then
his failure to do so would not seem to constitute negligence regardless of what
allegedly he actually thought. However, the court held that the humanitarian
doctrine was applicable; and thus the next question is, what proposition does the
case represent?
One interpretation seems to be that, where an instance of mutually inescapabler
peril is about to be created and where otherwise no duty to warn exists, then the
person who discovers the other has a duty to warn of the former's presence
although the latter be outside the zone of peril. Even assuming that this is not in
conflict with the basic concepts of Missouri's humanitarian doctrine,' the result
seems to indicate an extension' 9 of the doctrine at least according to the language
14. 148 S.W. (2d) 784, af 791 (Mo. 1941), the court saying, "The conductor
apparently recognized some precautions were advisable because he was on the high-
way north of the train to stop motorists from that direction."
15. Dimond v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 346 Mo. 333, 141 S.W. (2d) 789, 795
(1940); Hendley v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 198 Wis. 569, 225 N.W. 205 (1929) (hold-
ing there is no common law duty imposed on a railroad company to station employ-
ees on both sides of a halted freight train to give notice to approaching travelers of
the presence of such a conspicuous object in the highway, unless there were special
circumstances).
16. 148 S.W. (2d) 784, at 790 (Mo. 1941), concerning the element of special
circumstances which might make the crossing particularly hazardous, the court
said, "There was no such proof here."
17. Melenson v. Howell, 344 Mo. 1137, 130 S.W. (2d) 555 (1939) (holding
that "inescapable peril" within the last clear chance doctrine means peril which
the plaintiff is helpless to avoid by her own efforts, but which requires action on
the part of defendant to avert it).
18. Kellny v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 101 Mo. 67, 13 S.W. 806 (1890) (saying
that the doctrine ". . . is an exception made, on grounds of public policy and in the
interest of humanity . . ."). If this interpretation of the alleged extension is not
unfounded, then the question becomes one of social desirability; this question is
analyzed by McCleary, The Bases of the Humanitarian Doctrine Reexamined
(1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 56, 85.
19. Power v. Frischer, 229 Mo. App. 1056, 87 S.W. (2d) 692 (1935) (the
showing of mere possibility that defendant could have avoided the accident is not
sufficient to authorize recovery under the humanitarian rule); notes (1939) 119
A.L.R. 1041, 1083, (1934) 92 A.L.R. 47, 144 (last clear chance). Even the alleged
extension as such seems in conflict with the import of the opinion in Neill v. Alton
R. R., 113 S.W. (2d) 1073, 1077 (Mo. App. 1938) where that court said, "By the
time that plaintiff's peril should have been reasonably apparent to the engineer
even if he had been looking in plaintiff's direction, the train was so near the point
of collison that it could not have been stopped so as to avoid the accident." Yet
1942]
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of past opinions. Or instead, perhaps the court felt that the duty of signaling
should be continuous:20 Whichever view or other interpretation the court adopts,
the limits of this case should be defined at the first opportunity.
PAUL D. HESS, JR.
WILLS-PREsUMPTION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Kadderly v. Vossbrink'
In the case of Kadderly v. Vossbrink, a will was contested by two daughters
and a son of the decedent The proponents were the decedent's son-in-law (execu-
tor), daughter, grandson, and nurse. The testator, a man of 83 at the time the
will was executed, bequeathed the majority of his estate to the proponent daughter
and a substantial amount to the nurse. The contestants alleged undue influence
on the part of the son-in-law, the nurse, and the daughter. It was shown that the
son-in-law acted as financial advisor for testator; the contestants alleged that he was
under the complete domination of the son-in-law and the nurse. The court held
that undue influence, sufficient to break the will, was not shown and failed to find
anything which would create a presumption of undue influence over the testator.
The judgment of the trial court sustaining the will was affirmed.
Another recent Missouri case2 also involved the problem of undue influence;
here the contestant, an adopted daughter of testatrix, claimed undue influence by
the named trustees of the estate in having the remainder of the estate left to a church
upon the death of testatrix's sister. It was shown that these trustees had aided
testatrix in many ways and had arranged the execution of the will. The court
held there was no showing that the will was not the result of decedent's own free
agency and wishes; they found that the fact that the church was given precedence
over the plaintiff raised no presumption of undue influence.
The general rule as to when a presumption of undue influence upon a testator
is raised is that a confidential relationship alone, unaccompanied by some activity
that court did not place a duty upon defendant to give additional warning. The
only substantial difference in effect is that in the instant case the deceased had
been seen approaching. If this distinction is valid, then the effect of the instant case
would seem to be limited to discovered "peril," "peril" being used in the sense in
which the instant case extends it.
20. Although the court did not purport to base its opinion on the idea of
a continuous duty to signal, the court did say, 148 S.W. (2d) 784, at 792 (Mo.
1941), "But to us it seems the evidence made a case of prima facie negligence under
the humanitarian doctrine on the part of the fireman, or the engineer if the fireman
did adequately warn him." To which evidene does the court refer? The court
also said, at p. 790, "If he (deceased) was able only to reduce the violence of the
collison enough to save his life and had done so, respondents' cause of action would
not have arisen." Does this mean a cause of action under the Wrongful Death
Statute, or, does it mean any cause of action whatever? If it means the latter,
then it seems inconsistent with the court's ruling.
1. 149 S.W. (2d) 869 (Mo. 1941).
2. McGirl v. Wiltz, 148 S.W. (2d) 822 (Mo. 1941).
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by the party in the confidential position, is insufficient to create such a presump-
tion.$ The situation in Missouri on this point was rather confused until the case
of Loehr v. Starke.4 Before that decision it had been stated in numerous Missouri
cases that a presumption of undue influence arose upon the mere showing of the
existence of a relation of trust and confidence between a substantial beneficiary
and the testator.
5
In Loehr v. Starke, the undue influence was alleged to have resulted from
the relationship of physician and patient The court held that the showing of this
relationship alone was riot sufficient to establish the presumption of undue influence.
In reaching this result the court looked at the three cases considered as the basis
for the contention that the mere showing of a confidential relation raised the pre-
sumption of undue influence6 and clearly established that such a rule could not
be properly based on these decisions.
In the earliest of these,7 the relationship of guardian and ward had existed;
the ward was shown to have had implicit faith in the guardian and to have been
in very poor health at the time the will was executed. It was not the mere con-
fidential relation, but that relationship plus the other facts and circumstances
shown in the evidence which raised the presumption.
In both the other cases relied on for this contention8 there were, in addition
to a confidential relationship,9 other facts and circumstances which combined with
the relationship to create the presumption. In Harvey v. Sullens the devisee, a
stranger in blood, wrote the will, was made executor and received about five-sixths
of the estate; in Bridwell v. Swank the bequest was to the wife of the guardian,
but the circumstances were such that the presumption was raised, These cases
did not establish a rule that the mere existence of a confidential relation between
a testator and beneficiary is sufficient to raise a presumption of undue influence.
The supposed Missouri rule, before Loehr v. Starke, as to when the presump-
tion of undue influence is raised was clearly set out in Mowry v. Norman,'° where
the court stated that if facts were set out which established a fiduciary relationship,
or some such similar confidential relationship between a principal beneficiary and
the testator, then by proof of such a relationship and such a bequest the law
3. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) p. 517, § 196.
4. 332 Mo. 131, 56 S.W. (2d) 772 (1932).
5. Mowry v. Norman, 204 Mo. 173, 103 S.W. 15 (1907); Garvins' Adm'r v.
Williams, 44 Mo. 465 (1.869); Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455 (1884); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 328 Mo. 793, 41 S.W. (2d) 792 (1931); Kaechelen v. Barringer, 19 S.W.
(2d) 1033 (Mo. 1929); Smith v. Williams, 221 S.W. 360 (Mo. 1920); Clark v.
Crandall, 319 Mo. 87, 5 S.W. (2d) 383 (1928); Byrne v. Byrne, 250 Mo. 632, 157
S.W. 609 (1913); Soureal v. Wisner, 321 Mo. 920, 13 S.W. (2d) 548 (1929).
6. Garvins' Adm'r v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465 (1869); Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo.
147 (1870); Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455 (1884).
7 Garvins' Adm'r v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465 (1869).
8. Harvey v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147 (1870); Bridwell v. Swank, 84 Mo. 455
(1884).
9. In Harvey v. Sullens, the relationship was that of close neighbors; in
Bridwell v. Swank, it was that of guardian and ward.
10. 204 Mo. 173, 103 S.W. 15 (1907).
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indulged the presumption that undue influence had been used. This case cited
numerous authorities.1 Although the. court, before Loehr v. Starke, repeatedly
set out this minority rule, in most of the cases where it did so the facts were
sufficient to sustain the presumption under the general and majority rule. Mowry
v. Norman, along with all others so holding or stating was expressly overruled by
Loehr v. Starke, 2 which set up the proper rule that the presumption of undue
influence upon the testator would be indulged only upon the showing of a
confidential relationship plus other facts and circumstances in evidence from which
it could be inferred that the fiduciary beneficiary was actiie in some way which
caused or assisted in causing the execution of the will. The Missouri courts, in later
decisions,' 3 have cited Loehr v. Starke with approval on this point and it now
seems to set out the established rule.
The effect of the raising of a presumption of undue influence upon the burden
of proof in will contests seems to be to shift the burden of going forward with the
evidence from the contestants to the proponents.
The actual burden of proof, that is, the burden of establishing the will by a
preponderance of the evidence, is originally on the proponent of the will and never
shifts;1 4 but the burden of going forward with the evidence is capable of shifting
several times during the course of a will contest. The proponent may satisfy his
original burden of going forward by introducing evidence as to the proper execution
and attestation of the will and that the testator was of legal age and of sound mind.
Such a procedure establishes a prima facie case for the validity of the will." The
contestant may defeat this prima facie case by evidence of undue influence upon the
will of the testator by the proponent, which evidence may result in a presumption
of undue influence. If this presumption results, then the burden of going forward
with the evidence again shifts and it becomes the burden of the proponent to rebut
this presumption.'" Missouri seems to follow the orthodox view concerning burden
of proof up to this point' 7 However, according to the case of Loehr v. Starke'8
even though the proponent introduces rebutting testimony the presumption of undue
11. Campbell v. Carlisle, 162 Mo. 634, 644, 63 S.W. 701 (1901); Hegney v.
Head, 126 Mo. 619, 627, 29 S.W. 587 (1895); Roberts v. Bartlett, 190 Mo. 680, 702,
89 S.W. 858 (1905); Bradford v. Blossom, 190 Mo. 110, 143, 88 S.W. 721 (1905);
Dausman v. Rankin, 189 Mo. 677, 708, 88 S.W. 696 (1905); Maddox v. Maddox,
114 Mo. 35, 40, 21 S.W. 499 (1893).
12. See note 4, supra.
13. Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W. (2d) 400 (1935); Minturn
v. Conception Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179, 61 S.W. (2d) 352 (1933).
14. Rock v. Keller, 312 Mo. 458, 278 S.W. 759 (1926); Major v. Kidd, 261
Mo. 607, 170 S.W. 879 (1914); Mayes v. Mayes. 235 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1921).
15. Maddox v. Maddox, 114 Mo. 35, 21 S.W. 499 (1893); Soureal v. Wisner,
321 Mo. 920, 13 S.W. (2d) 548 (1929).
16. Clark v. Crandall, 319 Mo. 87, 5 S.W. (2d) 383 (1928); Harvey v. Sul-
lens, 46 Mo. 147 (1870); Gay v. Gillilan, 92 Mo. 250, 5 S.W. 7 (1887); Byrne v.
Byrne, 250 Mo. 632, 157 S.W. 609 (1913); Moll v. Pollack, 319 Mo. 744, 8 S.W.
(2d) 38 (1928).
17. ATKINSON, WILLS (1937) p. 508, § 196.
18. 332 Mo. 131, 56 S.W. (2d) 772 (1932).
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influence never disappears from the case, but establishes an issue which is for the'
jury. The court held that this presumption was not a mere legal fiction or procedural
rule, but that it rests upon a substantial basis of fact or inference. The court, in so
holding overruled previous cases which had held to the contrary, that the pre-
sumption did disappear upon the appearance of testimony rebutting the evidence
of undue influence. 9 The result of this decision seems to be to give this presump-
tion, when it has once been raised by the contestant, a good deal more weight
than is normally given to a presumption of fact, which is usually relied on only
in the absence of other evidence.
A careful consideration of the instant cases 20 shows that the court was correct
in holding that there was no substantial evidence showing a confidential relation-
ship which could act as a basis for a presumption of undue influence. The con-
testants failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise even a presumption of undue
influence, therefore the court properly held that the will should stand.
ELMUS L. MoNRoE
19. Denny v. Hicks, 2 S.W. (2d) 139 (Mo. 1928).
20. Kadderly v. Vossbrink, 149 S.W. (2d) 869 (Mo. 1941); McGirl v. Wiitz,
148 S.W. (2d) 822 (Mo. 1941).
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